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I. INTRODUCTION
Cashier's checks are utilized by con-artists to defraud
gullible consumers who accept these checks as payment for a
product or service The depositor is instructed to keep part of the
check's amount as compensation, and to wire the remainder
2outside of the country. The original cashier's check is returned to
the payee bank when found to be counterfeit, and the full amount
of the check is charged back to the depositor's account . The net
result is a loss for the consumer in the amount of money wired to
the con-artist and the value of the product or service for which he
did not receive any payment. If the fraudster cannot be found and
held accountable for the funds, the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) explicitly places any liability for the fraudulent cashier's
check on the depositor
Yet, what if prior to wiring the funds out of the country, the
depositor recognized the possibility of risk, and first made an
inquiry with the bank's staff regarding the propriety of the
instrument he deposited? What if, even after being assured by an
officer of the depository bank as to the availability of funds
represented by the cashier's check, the depositor again asks a
different officer to confirm what the first had said and is again
assured of this impending availability? Who then should bear the
liability of the fraudulent check?
The point of contention here concerns the underlying
difference between funds made available, and funds actually
1. See OCC Issues Special Bulletin on Fraudulent Cashier's Checks, 15 CLARK'S
BANK DEPOSITS AND PAYMENTS MONTHLY #9, Feb. 2007, at 2.
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. U.C.C. § 4-201 (2005).
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collected, by the depository bank.6 Under the Expedited Funds
Availability Act (EFAA),7 funds are first made available to the
depositor, but are not considered collected until payment is
received from the payor bank at final settlement This creates the
present liability conundrum because the UCC mandates that
liability remain with the depositor, not the depository bank, until
final settlement is made.9 The question then becomes whether the
bank should bear a portion of the loss where the depositor, as well
as the bank teller, are confused about this distinction between
available funds and collected funds, and if not, whether the bank
should have an affirmative duty to advise the depositor about
these differences.
On November 8, 2006, the Montana Supreme Court
decided in Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes'1 that despite the
UCC, a bank could bear some liability for negligently
misrepresenting the status of funds to their customers.1" Part II of
this Note provides an overview of how cashier's checks function,
details the various fraud scenarios employed by scam artists, and
lists some of the reasons fraud has increased in recent years.12 The
relationship between the depositor and the depository bank under
the UCC is examined in Part 11.13 Part IV analyzes Valley Bank
and the cases the Valley Bank court relied upon in reaching its
• 14
conclusion. Part V looks at the consequences of the Valley Bank
decision for banks and consumers. 5 Possible solutions to the
liability problem exposed by Valley Bank are explored in Part VI. 6
6. See Bank Liability for Misrepresenting that a Check is "Good," 15 CLARK'S
BANK DEPOSITS AND PAYMENTS MONTHLY #10, Mar. 2007, at 3-4.
7. 12 C.F.R. § 229.10 (2007).
8. Id. Final settlement occurs when the depository bank receives payment from
the payee bank for an item, relieving the depositor of the liability that he carries
when there has only been a provisional settlement, which is that between the
depositor and the depository bank. See 12 C.F.R. § 229 app. E (2007).
9. U.C.C. § 4-201 cmt. 6 (2005) (noting that Section 4-201 recognizes the "prima
facie status of most banks as agents" who will generally not be liable for the actions
of their depositor-principle).
10. 147 P.3d 185 (Mont. 2006).
11. See id. at 193.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part VI.
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This Note ultimately concludes that a bank-imposed education
program is the best means of preventing the confusion associated
with available versus collected funds.1
7
II. AN OVERVIEW OF CASHIER'S CHECK FRAUD AND COMMON
FRAUD SCENARIOS
A. Cashier's Checks - Common Practice
A cashier's check is one "issued by a bank, and sold to its
customer" to be payable to a third party.'8 Federal law establishes
the following criteria for creating a valid cashier's check: that it be
"drawn on a depository institution," "signed by an officer or
employee of such depository institution," and "a direct obligation
of such depository institution. ' 9  Because it functions as an
express liability of the issuing bank and not the purchaser, a
cashier's check is traditionally afforded a presumption of
reliability.20 This relative safety makes a cashier's check a common
medium in transactions where the seller and purchaser do not
know each other and where prices are often high and time is a
premium, such as an agreement to purchase real estate or an
automobile.2'
The EFAA sets forth the general rule that the funds
represented by a cashier's check will be available for withdrawal
the day after deposit 2  Hold limits under the EFAA were
originally contemplated in part because "ninety-nine percent of all
checks are paid the first time a bank seeks to collect on them," and
bank holding policies at the time the EFAA was passed were
17. See infra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
18. OCC Consumer Advisory No. 2007-1, at 1 (Jan. 16, 2007), available at http://w
ww.occ.treas.gov/ftp/ADVISORY/2007-1.html.
19. 12 U.S.C. § 4001(5) (2000).
20. See OCC Consumer Advisory No. 2007-1, supra note 18.
21. Justin Pritchard, Cashier's Checks - Overview, ABOUT.CoM, http://banking.ab
out.com/od/checkingaccounts/a/cashierschecks.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 4002(a)(2)(F) (2000). Conditions for next-day availability include
that the check was deposited into an account held by a payee of the check, in person
to an employee of the depository bank, and with a special deposit slip or envelope
where required by the depository bank. Id. Cashier's checks not meeting these
conditions are extended to two business days for local and six business days for non-
local articles. Id. § 4002(c)(1-2).
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creating millions in losses for consumers. It was a clear tradeoff
of economic efficiency in exchange for a heightened exposure to
fraud2 4  When fraud victims confuse funds made available by
EFAA implementation regulations with funds that have been
collected, they will be more prone to withdraw and dispense them
in compliance with the scammer's plan.2
Further, the EFAA only allows a bank to place an
extended hold on the availability of funds in a few specific
26instances. The bank can place a hold on deposits greater than
$5,000 for a reasonable time, but the $5,000 ceiling must be made
available to the depositor. Similarly, a hold may be placed on
redeposited checks unless the check was returned for missing an
endorsement, as well as deposits to accounts that suffer repeated
overdrafts. Where there is "reasonable cause to believe that the
check is uncollectible from the paying bank," the payee bank may
also hold a check.29 However, the "well-grounded belief in the
mind of a reasonable person" that the statute requires may not be
based on the class of the check. ° Lastly, the regulations allow for
a depository bank to hold a cashier's check for new accounts
opened less than thirty days, and in emergency conditions such as
a natural disaster.31 In the absence of any hold, the customer will
be able to draw upon the deposit almost immediately, despite the
potential that the check is a fake and the deposit will be reversed.
23. William R. Greer, Speeding Crediting of Checks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1986, at
48 (noting many losses were due to penalty charges for bounced checks because the
bank had placed an excessively long hold on an instrument that would otherwise
prevent the penalty). In the banking context, a hold period refers to that time during
which the depository bank maintains possession over funds prior to releasing them to
the depositor. Id.
24. Emma Coleman Jordan, Ending the Floating Check Game: The Policy
Arguments for Delayed Availability Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 515, 520 (1985).
25. OCC Issues Special Bulletin on Fraudulent Cashier's Checks, supra note 1,
at 3.
26. 12 C.F.R. § 229.13 (2007).
27. Id. § 229.13(b).
28. Id. § 229.13(c).
29. Id. § 229.13(e).
30. Id. A cashier's check is considered a class of check.
31. Id. § 229.13(a), (f).
32. OCC Issues Special Bulletin on Fraudulent Cashier's Checks, supra note 1,
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B. Common Fraud Scenarios
Fraudulent cashier's check complaints generally fall into
five fact patterns.33
The first pattern involves a consumer who sells goods in
person or over the Internet.34 When the buyer gives or sends the
fraudulent check to the seller, the seller ships the goods to the
buyer.35 The scammer gets valuable goods while the seller is left
holding a bad check.36
In the second scenario, the fraudulent check sent to the
seller is actually in excess of the amount agreed upon for the
goods. 37 The seller agrees to wire the excess to the buyer who is
often located in another country and sometimes offers the seller
additional compensation for the transfer.38
In a third scam, the consumer receives notice that he or she
is the recipient of a windfall - usually either an inheritance or the
proceeds of a foreign lottery.39 The notice then instructs the
consumer to wire a sum of money outside the country to pay for
processing fees or taxes on the windfall, and includes a fraudulent
cashier's check to reimburse the consumer for those costs. 4
In the fourth scenario, the consumer is selected to work as
a mystery shopper, and is provided with a fraudulent cashier's
check to be used to purchase goods from various stores.4' The
consumer is then instructed to wire the remainder of those funds
to a third party outside of the country.42
Finally, the consumer is contacted to act as a money
transfer agent between a party inside the United States and a
foreign party. 3 The consumer receives a fraudulent cashier's
33. OCC Bulletin No. 2007-2, at 1 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.occ.tre
as.gov/ftp/bulletin/2007-2.html.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See OCC Bulletin No. 2007-2, supra note 33.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
2008]
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check from the domestic party, is instructed to keep a commission
as compensation for the service, and wires the remainder to the
foreign party.44
Each of the five scenarios carries a similar pattern of loss
for the bank customer.45  Believing the check to be valid, the
customer deposits the check into a depository account.46 When the
funds are made available, the customer transfers either goods or
funds to a third party as requested.47 At some point, the check is
found to be fraudulent, and the depository bank reverses the credit
to the customer's account.48 Because the customer has already
mailed his goods or wired funds to what are typically foreign
entities, there is almost no possibility of recovery from the actual
perpetrator of the fraud, and the well-intentioned depositor is
made to suffer the burden of loss alone.49
C. Fraud Stimuli
The recent proliferation of cashier's check fraud has been
compounded by the domestication of mainstream computing. °
Widely available and easy to use desktop publishing software was
first used to forge a new generation of counterfeit checks in the
mid-1990s.5 Similar techniques allow a fraudster to duplicate
cashier's checks, placing a replica of an official bank officer's
authorizing signature onto what would otherwise appear to be a
perfectly valid commercial article. Furthermore, the proliferation
of Internet-based sales and exchange websites, such as eBay, has
created an entirely different avenue for potential fraud to
prosper. 3 Many victims are only occasional sellers operating
44. Id.
45. OCC Bulletin No. 2007-2, supra note 33, at 2.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. OCC Consumer Advisory No. 2007-1, supra note 18, at 1.
50. Saul Hansell, New Breed of Check Forgers Exploits Desktop Publishing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at 1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?re
s=9902E6DE1030F936A2575BCOA962958260.
51. Id.
52. Fraudulent Cashier's Checks from the Payor Bank's Viewpoint, 15 CLARK'S
BANK DEPOSITS AND PAYMENTS MONTHLY #9, Feb. 2007, at 4.
53. Susan Stellin, Online Sellers Fall Victim to Counterfeit Cashier's Checks, N.Y.
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alone, with little knowledge of cashier's check fraud or reason to
suspect deception.14 In addition, mass-email has become a cost
effective means for fraudsters to communicate with potential
victims on an international level, and is often the first step towards
perpetrating a scheme.55 Lastly, in reference to the aforemen-
tioned "mystery shopper" scenario, websites such as Monster and
CareerBuilder have become prime fishing grounds for potential
victims, where false employers are provided with a vast pool of
willing targets innocently posting contact information to attract
employment.56
III. THE DEPOSITOR AND THE DEPOSITORY BANK UNDER THE
UcC
When a customer deposits a check with a bank, the bank
generally credits the customer's account and makes the funds
available for withdrawal almost immediately, pursuant to the
EFAA" The UCC refers to this as a "provisional settlement,"
because the depository bank has not yet collected the funds from
the paying bank.58 Until final settlement is made, "the risk of non-
collection remain[s] with the customer."5 9 This policy reflects the
UCC objective of "promoting certainty and predictability in
commercial transactions" by pre-assigning which party bears
liability in case a check is deemed fraudulent. 6° This policy also
reflects the problem of placing liability on the depository bank, as
the sheer volume of items handled daily would make proper
inspection a virtual blockade on efficient banking.6' Further, the
TIMES, May 15, 2003, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990
0E2D71F3FF936A25756COA9659C8B63.
54. Id.
55. David Magliano, Scammers Can Find Clever Ways to Fool Their Victims,
WALTON SUN, Mar. 24, 2007.
56. Miranda Marquit, Consumer Alert: Fraudulent Cashier's Checks, ALL Bus.,
May 16, 2007, http://www.allbusiness.com/4058099-1.html.
57. U.C.C. § 4-214(a) (2005).
58. Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185,190 (Mont. 2006).
59. Amthor v. Commerce Bank, No. 06-3311, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Misc. 2007).
60. Call v. Ellenville Nat'l Bank, 774 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). This
contrasts with common law comparative fault principles that would otherwise not be
in line with UCC objectives. Id.
61. U.C.C. § 4-201 cmt. 6 (2005).
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UCC places liability with the depositor as "the party best able to
prevent the loss by the exercise of care" because he is the closest
party to the scammer The net result of these policies serves dual
objectives of promoting market efficiency, as well as extending
predictability to the resolution of possible disputes.63
The UCC reserves the right of "charge back" for the
depository bank where a cashier's check is found to be fraudulent
and returned by the paying bank, allowing the depositor's bank to
debit the depositor's account by the amount unpaid by the paying
bank.64 This is because before final settlement is made on the
check, the collecting bank is acting essentially as the agent for the
owner of the check, and accordingly will not be held personally
61liable for the losses of the owner.
The UCC also makes explicit that the right of charge back
will not be affected by a "failure by any bank to exercise ordinary
care with respect to the item." 66 By preventing litigation based on
"the depository bank's own negligence," the UCC is trying to
circumvent "difficult questions of fact" that would only serve to
bog down the banking industry in arduous litigation.67
Finally, the fact that the bank makes funds available and
the customer uses those funds also has no effect on the right of
charge back. 68 This reflects the treatment of traditional "cash
items," which enjoy an over ninety-nine percent final payment rate
after provisional settlement is made.69
IV. DISPLACING THE UCC - THE VALLEY BANK CASE
In Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, Mr. Hughes was
contacted by fraudsters offering between $3 million to $4.5 million
62. Call v. Ellenville Nat'l Bank, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (quoting Putnam Rolling
Ladder Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 74 N.Y.2d 340, 349 (1989)).
63. Id.
64. U.C.C. § 4-214(a) (2005) (noting that charge back must be done by the
"midnight deadline or within a longer reasonable time after" the depository bank
learns of the return or is sent notification of that fact).
65. See U.C.C. § 4-201 (2005).
66. U.C.C. § 4-214(d)(2) (2005).
67. See U.C.C. § 4-214 cmt. 5 (2005).
68. U.C.C. § 4-214(d)(1) (2005).
69. U.C.C. § 4-214 cmt. 1 (2005); see Greer, supra note 23.
360 [Vol. 12
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as a commission for facilitating the exportation of farm equipment
to Africa.70 Hughes was sent four checks on March 22, 2002 - two
"official checks" and two personal checks - and was expected to
wire $800,000 to a third party as "advance fees."7  Before he
deposited the checks, Hughes consulted with a bank officer at
Valley Bank as to their validity; with regard to the "official
checks," the bank official said that "official checks" were "same as
cash," and "just like cashier's checks," and that Hughes may do
with the funds as he wished.72 A second bank official corroborated
the guidance of the first.73 Hughes' wife later testified at trial that
he told her that "everybody at the bank assured him that the
checks would be good. ' 74 On March 26, 2002, Valley Bank wired
$800,000 to an accountholder in Amman, Jordan, pursuant to a
written request received from Hughes on that same day.75
Approximately ten minutes later, Hughes and Valley Bank
learned that one of the personal checks was being returned for
non-sufficient funds, and they immediately tried to stop the wire
transfer.76 Efforts to cancel the wire transfer were unsuccessful,
and it was later learned that the remaining checks were
counterfeit.77 When Valley Bank exercised its right of charge back
against Hughes, resulting in an overdraft of $800,000, Hughes was
forced to withdraw $600,000 from a retirement account and set up
a trust by mortgaging his home to pay off the remainder.78 When
the trust failed to make the required payments, Valley Bank
moved to foreclose on October 15, 2002. 79 Hughes then counter-
claimed for a number of common law wrongs, including negligent
misrepresentation based on claims made by a bank teller regarding
the clearance of a check that had in fact not reached final
70. Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185,188 (Mont. 2006).
71. Id. (discussing "official checks," which are generally the same as "cashier's
checks").
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185,188 (Mont. 2006).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 189.
79. Id.
20081
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settlement. 0
The trial court dismissed all of Hughes' counterclaims,
stating that because the UCC occupies the realm of check
collections, there is no place to assert common law.8' The UCC
states that unless "displaced by particular provisions of the UCC,"
principles of common law will "supplement its provisions., 82 In
the absence of a contrary section, "the UCC preempts principles of
common law and equity that are inconsistent with either its
provisions or its purposes and policies. 8 3 Thus, any claim Hughes
might have had under common law negligence was preempted by
the UCC provision that allows charge back even where the
depository bank is negligent. 84
The Montana Supreme Court agreed with the trial court
that the UCC governed check processing.8' However, because
Hughes' claim encompassed the "bank's communications" in
addition to check processing, and "[b]ecause such communications
are not addressed with specificity by the UCC," the Supreme
Court held that common law principles may be applied to the
bank's communications to Hughes. 6 Therefore, the court rea-
soned that it was at least possible to obtain a judgment against
Valley Bank for the amount of the charge back.87 Although the
Montana Supreme Court remanded this issue to the trial court for
further proceedings, it did highlight three cases which may lend
some credence to future recoveries for negligent misrep-
resentation.8
A. Chase v. Morgan Guarantee Trust Co.
In Chase v. Morgan Guarantee Trust Co.,'9 the court
considered the question of when a bank could be held liable for
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2005).
83. U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (2005).
84. U.C.C. § 4-214 (2005).
85. Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d at 191.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 192.
88. See id. at 192-93.
89. 590 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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negligence when it fails to exercise ordinary care with respect to
the check under UCC section 4-214(d). 90 The facts of the case
centered around three representations allegedly made by the
bank.91 First, the bank did not warn of a well-known collection
delay associated with Cayman Island checks.92 Second, the bank
claimed that if the check was in fact bad, the bank would know
within ten business days; in fact, it was eleven days before the bank
learned that the check was dishonored.93 Finally, based on his
conversation with the bank's vice president, the depositor believed
that the check had cleared even though the vice president did not
specifically say collection had occurred.94
The opinion noted that although the UCC will "not hold
liable for charge[ ]back a bank whose employee inadvertently in
some remark misleads a customer as to the precise likelihood that
an item will clear .. . the outcome might be different if a bank
expressly informed a customer that it had made a final settlement
on the account." 95 This was interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Valley Bank to demonstrate that other courts recognize the
possibility of applying common law principles to negligent bank
communicalions, as long as the appropriate facts are present.
96
B. Allen v. Carver Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
In Allen v. Carver Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 7 the
court considered a parallel question of liability for a depository
bank where there were allegations of negligence in the handling of
the charged-back item.98 However, there was no distinction made
between a bank's duties in processing the check and its
communications with the depositor.99 The facts in Allen, consisting
90. Id. at 1138; U.C.C. § 4-214(d) (2005); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 4-212 (Consol.
2007).
91. Chase, 590 F. Supp. at 1138-39.
92. Id. at 1139.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185, 192 (Mont. 2006).
97. 477 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Term 1984).
98. See id.
99. See id.
20081
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of statements made by a "depositor that an unidentified teller told
her that a check had 'cleared,' when in fact it had not," did not
constitute the "quantum of proof" to prevail against the bank.l°°
From this, the Supreme Court in Valley Bank noted that
there remains some "quantum of proof" that would be sufficient to
substantiate a common law claim against the bank if different facts
were present.' 1
C. Call v. Ellenville National Bank
Lastly, in Call v. Ellenville National Bank,' 2 the court, in
discussing the proper allocation of liability under the UCC for
fraudulent checks, noted that the "carefully drawn balance" of the
UCC should not be interrupted by common law, and that liability
is allocated to the bank customer because the customer is "the
party best able to prevent the loss by the exercise of care."'0 3 It
followed that this allocation should not be altered because of the
alleged representation by the bank to Mr. Call that the check had
cleared.'04 The court noted that "the term 'cleared' is not
employed in the UCC and, as commonly used, is not the
equivalent of 'final settlement.""0' 5 Further, while Mr. Call may
have believed these terms to be synonymous, he never alleged
"that this was a result of any inquiry with or representation to that
effect by the defendant bank."' 6
The Supreme Court in Valley Bank believed this alone left
open the issue of whether the "bank's misrepresentation of the
status of the check settlement process could lead to liability for the
bank."'0 7
100. Id. at 538.
101. Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 193.
102. 774 N.Y.S.2d 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
103. Id. at 78 (quoting Putnam Rolling Ladder Co. v, Mfrs, Hanover Trust Co.,
546 N.E.2d 904, 908 (N.Y. 1989)).
104. See id. at 78.
105. Id. at 79. The Valley Bank court questioned this assertion by stating "we
pause to express bewilderment at this statement of the Call court. If the term
'cleared' means anything in common banking usage, it is that final settlement has
occurred." Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 193.
106. Call, 774 N.Y.S.2d at 79.
107. Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 193.
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D. Valley Bank Revisited
Examining the specific facts in Valley Bank, however, it
seems unlikely that there was evidence sufficient to impose
liability on the bank for negligent misrepresentation."" Hughes'
evidence that the "official checks" were the "same as cash" is far
from saying that they had "cleared" or were "good," and more
likely refers to the expedited funds availability requirement that
rewards cashier's checks for their traditional reliability.' 9 The only
mention that the checks were "good" comes from Mrs. Hughes'
deposition testimony, which would likely be inadmissible in court
as hearsay ° and would probably do little to further the claim."'
Therefore, the bar for negligent misrepresentation liability will
probably not be set until a stronger fact pattern arises in a
subsequent controversy.
V. STATE OF BANKING AFTER VALLEY BANK
A. Concerns for the Depository Bank
Valley Bank demonstrates that negligent misrepresentation
could become a very real financial threat to depository banks in
cases of cashier's check fraud where future courts find facts
sufficient to impose liability under common law negligence. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in a bulletin
dated January 8, 2007, highlights several additional concerns for
depository banks."3
Preeminent among these additional concerns is possible
reputation damage arising from complaints and litigation.
114
Without regard to the legitimacy of victims' claims, it is perfectly
reasonable to assume that the inability to recover from the true
108. Bank Liability for Misrepresenting that a Check is "Good, " supra note 6, at 4.
109. Id. (citing Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 188).
110. See FED. R. EvID. 801; see also Bank Liability for Misrepresenting that a
Check is "Good," supra note 6, at 4.
111. Bank Liability for Misrepresenting that a Check is "Good," supra note 6, at 4
(citing Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 188).
112. See supra Part IV.
113. OCC Bulletin No. 2007-2, supra note 33, at 3.
114. Id.
2008]
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perpetrator of the fraud would leave victims trying to recover from
the only party left - their banks.'15 In addition, malcontent, often
high net-worth bank customers might turn to other banks for
future business once soured by what they view as losses caused in
part or in whole by their depository banks."6 While this may not
be much of a concern for large national and multinational banking
institutions, small, local banks probably cannot afford to lose their
wealthier patrons. 7
The OCC bulletin also makes note of possible credit
concerns where reversals may result in negative balances that
118
would become a virtual loan that would then require recovery.
This is considered a virtual loan because it is not the product of
any formal lending agreement, but instead comes from
circumstances where a charge back results in an overdraft. 9 The
bank may then have to deal with a customer without the means -
or the intent - to repay the loan, leading to either costly litigation
or a mutual loss through settlement.
B. Valley Bank Comments
In the Valley Bank case, the Montana Supreme Court
presented an imaginative analysis of three seemingly contrary
cases to suggest that, when bank communications are separated
from check processing, it is possible to displace UCC protections
and hold a depository bank liable for negligent
misrepresentation. 2 ' The court distinguished bank commun-
ications from check processing to promote the possibility of
applying common law negligence in cases where bank personnel
provided erroneous information to customers victimized by
115. See id.
116. Cf id. (expanding on the idea that losses due to cashier's check fraud may
create a divide between customers and their depository banks).
117. Cf id. (inferring that the previous assertion would understandably have a
greater effect on smaller depository banks which may relay on the deposits of only a
few wealthy individuals that they could not afford to lose).
118. See id.
119. OCC Bulletin No. 2007-2, supra note 33, at 3.
120. See id.
121. See supra Part IV.
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fraudulent cashier's checks.22 Yet, it remains to be seen whether
Valley Bank will be cited in support by courts outside of Montana,
or whether it will remain an outlier reaching for principles without
subsequent legal support.
In Amthor v. Commerce Bank,12 3 a case decided after Valley
Bank, the plaintiff deposited a cashier's check for $6,470 on
September 7, 2005.124 At the time of the deposit, the plaintiff was
advised by a bank teller that the check would clear in two to three
days.125 On September 9, the plaintiff withdrew $5,050, asserting
that representations made by bank employees assured him that the
check would clear by September 10.126 On September 10, the
plaintiff was assured by a customer service representative that the
check had in fact cleared, and sent a money gram for $5,050 to a
third party outside of the United States.27 On September 12, theS 128
deposit was coded as a high risk return check. The check was
subsequently dishonored and the funds represented by the check
were charged back to the plaintiff's account.129
The wealth of communication between the plaintiff and the
defendant bank in Amthor could easily be compared to that
between Hughes and Valley Bank.130 And yet, there is no mention
of bank communications as separate from check processing, and
no discussion of applying common law negligence rules by
displacing the UCC. 3' Instead, the Amthor court cited Call in
mandating that the liability remained with the depositor while any
payment upon the cashier's check was provisional. Further, it
122. See id.
123. No. 06-3311, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Misc. May 1, 2007).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Amthor, slip op. at 1.
130. See id.; see also Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185 (Mont. 2006).
131. See Amthor, slip op. at 3. "Plaintiffs argue that the alleged negligent
misrepresentations made by employees of the defendant-bank, relied upon to their
detriment, entitle them to a recovery not withstanding the provisions of the UCC."
Id. From this language, it is unclear whether the plaintiff actually argued a non-UCC
negligence claim; this may be the reason that the court neglects any discussion of
common law negligence. See id.
132. Id. at 2.
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cited the Allen decision to explicitly show that liability could not
be shifted simply because there was some reliance on statements
made by tellers that the checks had "cleared" or that the funds
were made available for withdrawal.'33 This might suggest, then,
that the reliance of the Supreme Court in Valley Bank on
seemingly abstract derivatives of the Call and Allen opinions may
have been in reality too distant a stretch for mainstream
jurisprudence to accept."
VI. POST VALLEY BANK: PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
If the Valley Bank decision signals a new renaissance of
judicial activism aimed at shifting liability to depository banks, the
next logical point of analysis concerns the impact of that liability
on those banks. This Part outlines three alternative solutions to
the problem of allocating liability in situations of confusion
parallel to Valley Bank.
A. Recommended Bank Protocol and Consumer Education
Banks can most effectively minimize the effect of any
subsequent reformation in judicial philosophy by exercising proper
caution in communicating with their customers to prevent fraud
from ever occurring.13 5 Banks not already practicing formal
education programs for officers and employees need to begin
training those employees with direct contact with the public.3 6 A
broad sweeping statement like the check is "good" or will "clear"
should never be made until final settlement has occurred. 37 In
addition, the banking staff should educate depositors about the
complicated area of law governing their deposits, and should
advise them that there is always a chance, whether due to fraud or
other cause, that the check will be dishonored by the drawee
133. Id. at 3.
134. See Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d at 185.
135. See Bank Liability for Misrepresenting that a Check is "Good," supra note 6,
at 4 (citing Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 188).
136. Cf id (expanding on the suggestion that the best practice is to make clear that
there is always "a chance that any check will be dishonored" by a drawee bank).
137. Id. at 4.
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bank." Consumer education perhaps offers the greatest means of
preventing and detecting fraud, because consumers manifest the
loss and are initially held liable for it. 39
In light of this paradigm of confusion, one suggested
approach to alleviate mutual stress could be a cooperative
institution of formal loan agreements between depository banks
and victims of fraud, allowing the customer to repay over a period
of time rather than to force payment immediately.' 4 Such an
arrangement would serve to reduce the stress and litigiousness
inherent to situations of confusion and uncertainty that can follow
where depositors face a substantial negative balance due to
fraud.'4 In addition, it is in the best interests of all parties involved
to work together to combat the divisiveness of fraud victimization,
and to buttress existing relationships threatened by the potentially
corrosive effects of arbitrarily allocated liability.
42
B. Legislative Solution - Uniform Commercial Code
A second possible, and less attractive, solution to the
problem of allocating depository liability where teller and
depositor are both confused about the applicable law is the formal
separation of check processing from bank communications under
the UCC. Because the depositor is often an occasional seller,
rather than a merchant, he may not be aware of the fraud
scenarios that are all too familiar to merchants and banks alike.143
All of the depositors in the aforementioned cases, including Valley
Bank, displayed a lack of familiarity with the terminology and
inner workings of banking law in their attempts to confirm their
actions with multiple members of the bank.' 44 This implicates the
138. See id.
139. Thecla Fabian, ABA Survey Finds Rapid Check Scam Rise, Off-Shore
Criminals 21" Century Bandits, 89 BANKING REP. 900 (Dec. 3, 2007).
140. OCC Bulletin No. 2007-2, supra note 33 at 3.
141. See id.
142. Cf id (recommending that a cooperative lending solution, in addition to
providing assistance to the depositor in their claims against the fraud perpetrators,
may be in the best interest of the depository bank).
143. See, e.g., Valley Bank of Ronan v. Hughes, 147 P.3d 185 (Mont. 2006);
Amthor v. Commerce Bank, No. 06-3311, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Misc. May 1, 2007).
144. See, e.g., Valley Bank, 147 P.3d at 185; Amthor, slip op. at 1.
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UCC contention that until final settlement is made, liability restsw i t h h e . . 1 4 5
with the depositor; it seems perfectly reasonable to suggest that a
bank, having both a familiarity with cashier's check fraud and the
resources with which to combat it, would be in a better position
than the once-a-year online auctioneer to prevent the fraud. If a
state legislature amended its respective UCC provisions in a way
that acknowledged the common law remedy for negligence related
to bank communications, there would no longer be a preemption
defense when such claims are brought. 14' Where recognized, the
negligence would occur when a bank employee is specifically
asked about whether a particular check is good; to avoid any
liability, the bank employee should ideally explain the legal
implications of available versus collected funds, and avoid any
ambiguous or misleading statements about the validity of a
depository instrument.
147
For this solution to be effective, however, every jurisdiction
would have to recognize this cause of action, as one common law
finding in a given state will not definitively bind a court in
another.' 48 This method could be incredibly time consuming, and
may result in inconsistent application where enacted based on the
specific wording or interpretation of such amendments.' 9  In
addition, a simultaneous state legislative act would understandably
foster the need for considerable organization and funding, and
may become financially more demanding than the cost effective,
hands-on approach of educating both bank employees and
customers. Also, this solution is contrary to the idea that bank
145. See Call v. Ellenville Nat'l Bank, 5 A.D.3d 521,523 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
146. U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 2 (2005).
147. Cf. Red Tape Chronicles, http://redtape.msnbc.com (Oct. 3, 2007, 15:29 EST)
(depicting a scenario where one bank began training its tellers to educate their clients
about check fraud and how that reduced the amount of check fraud by eighty-five
percent).
148. Cf. Monica Kilian, CISG and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdiction, 10
FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 217 (discussing the difficult divide of jurisdiction
when striving for a uniform application of law).
149. Cf. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Computer Software Contracts: A Review of
the Case Law, 21 AKRON L. REV. 45 (1987) (discussing how different courts disagree
about the scope of Article 2 of the UCC).
150. Cf. Robert Tanner, State-Level Lobbying Costs $570M, http://www.commond
reams.org/headlines02/0501-08.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (discussing that
businesses, unions, and others spent $570,000,000 in 2002 hoping to influence their
state legislatures).
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customers should not rely upon all statements made by bank
employees, and instead should seek out formal bank officers or
managers rather than just a teller.' Therefore, this solution is
inferior to the initial proposal of preventing fraud losses through
education.52
C. Legislative Solution - Expedited Funds Availability Act
A more immediate and uniform solution to the problem of
allocating depository liability where teller and depositor are both
confused about the applicable law requires action from the Federal
Reserve Board (Board). 53 Within the EFAA, Congress granted
the Board discretion to adopt exceptions to the EFAA's hold
limits if the Board determines that depository institutions are
experiencing an "unacceptable level of losses due to fraud" and
that such exceptions would be necessary to "diminish the volume
of such fraud.', 5 4  The extension of hold periods could grant
potential victims an adequate window through which available
funds make the transition into collected funds without first being
transferred to a third party.5 5 Therefore, the Board could help
curb fraud by deciding that current losses exceed an acceptable
level and utilizing the power granted by Congress to adopt explicit
means of correcting that problem.5 6  The invocation of this
exception would require a formal regulation or an order by the
Board, as well as the preparation of a regular report justifying the
hold before Congress."5
While this solution would have the immediate effect of
curbing fraud, it would also act as a hindrance to commerce by
inserting an impediment to the efficient transfer of funds under the
151. Cf Allen v. Carver Federal Sav. And Loan Ass'n, 477 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538
(N.Y. App. Term 1984) (discounting the weight of a "mere statement of a depositor
that an unidentified teller told her [mistakenly] that a check had "cleared," when in
fact it had not").
152. See supra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
153. See 12 C.F.R. § 229.13 (2007).
154. 12 U.S.C. § 4003(e) (2000).
155. Cf id (postulating that where hold limits are extended, depositors will wait
longer periods to access possibly fraudulent deposits).
156. See Magliano, supra note 55.
157. 12 U.S.C. § 4003(e).
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current regime."8 Decisions about hold limitations under the
EFAA were carefully crafted to promote economic efficiency and
commerce, and a reversal here would essentially destroy that
purpose. 9 Therefore, this solution is also inferior to a basic
prescription of education and prevention.16
VII. CONCLUSION
The UCC's preference for black and white assignments of
liability for bank deposits finds its motives in promoting an "ease-
of-business" philosophy in the marketplace.16" ' Yet, the massive
proliferation of check fraud in the recent past has muddled
previously clear waters, bringing pause to the mechanical cadence
of UCC drummers.162 The reality of the situation is that the divide
between predator and prey is too great where hunters employ
technology, experience, and cunning to assault victims who, while
perhaps too trusting, cannot even derive protection in the laws of
their homeland.63 It can be argued that victims like Mr. Hughes
were careful, and while they may not have understood the
intricacies of an especially complicated banking law, they relied
upon the guarantees made by banking personnel in conducting
their affairs to their detriment.' 64 Accordingly, the Valley Bank
court was the first to postulate that it is possible to shift some or all
of this liability to the depository bank where it can be found
negligent for bank communications, since such communications
are outside the scope of the UCC.'
6 1
However, the Valley Bank decision should not be the savior
for Mr. Hughes and thousands of annual victims like him. The
court's reasoning, while angelic, is muddled and will probably not
be respected by other courts.' 66  Furthermore, banks and
depositors, as parallel victims of rampant cashier's check fraud,
158. See Jordan, supra note 24, at 553.
159. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part VI.A.
161. See supra Part III.
162. See supra Part II.C.
163. See id.
164. See supra Part IV.
165. See id.
166. See supra Part V.
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can look outside the judicial system for a final determination of
liability allocation where both parties are confused as to the true
status of funds ending in a loss.167 For example, the parties could
lobby individual state legislatures for changes to the UCC or the
EFAA. 16 Yet, both parties would be best served by the formal
institution of bank-sponsored consumer education programs.169
Such programs could help prevent fraud, losses, and subsequent
disputes by eliminating any confusion over the applicable law at
170the time of deposit.
ALEX Y. LIEBERMAN
167. See supra Part VI.B-C.
168. See id.
169. See supra VI.A.
170. See id.
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